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“PUTTING THE CHILD FIRST”: A
NECESSARY STEP IN THE
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO
IDENTITY
Michelle Giroux and Mariana De Lorenzi*
Abstract:
In recent years, the number of nations which
have banned the anonymous character of gamete donations has
increased, including nations that once strongly supported such
a position. This shift in national legislative policy worldwide
has aided a growing recognition of the right to know one’s
origins in international law and gives a wider effect to this
fundamental right. In Canada, while there has been discussion
about the importance of the right to know one’s biological
origins, this right has not been universally guaranteed through
legislation, either to adoptees or to the donor-conceived. This
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article refers mostly to Québec legislation, but combines
analyses of Québec civil law and common law with continental
European legal developments, which can assist legislative
reform across the country. The authors are defending the
existence of a fundamental right of the child to know his or her
biological origins as part of the right to identity protected by
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and are
therefore focusing on the perspective of the child. Pursuant to
the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Renvoi, which
partially invalidated the federal legislation that regulated
assisted human reproduction, this article takes a position in
favour of provincial and territorial law reform that would
explicitly recognize the right of the child to know his or her
biological origins and ban anonymity in the context of gamete
donation.
Résumé:
Depuis quelques années, le nombre de pays qui
a banni le caractère anonyme du don de gamète a augmenté,
incluant des pays qui auparavant supportaient une telle
position. Ce changement de politique législative nationale au
niveau mondial a favorisé une reconnaissance grandissante du
droit fondamental de connaître ses origines biologiques en
droit international. Au Canada, ce droit n’est pas
universellement garanti par la législation, que ce soit pour les
enfants adoptés ou issus de la procréation assistée, bien qu’il y
ait eu des discussions au sujet de son importance. Tout en
mettant l’accent sur le droit québécois, ce texte suggère une
analyse intégrée des deux deux systèmes juridiques canadiens
et introduit des éléments de droit continental européeen. Cela
apporte un éclairage utile pour la réforme du droit dans les
autres juridictions provinciales du Canada. Les auteurs
soutiennent qu’il existe un droit fondamental de l’enfant de
connaître ses origines biologiques, composante du droit à
l’identité, protégé dans la Convention relative aux droits de
l’enfant des Nations Unies (CIRDE). Conformément au Renvoi
de décembre 2010 de la Cour suprême du Canada ayant
invalidé plusieurs articles de la Loi fédérale sur la procréation
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assistée, c’est une question qui relève de la compétence des
provinces. L’article prend position en faveur d’une réforme
législative au niveau provincial afin de reconnaître
explicitement le droit de connaître ses origines biologiques et
d’interdire le caractère anonyme du don de gamète.
INTRODUCTION
Gamete donor anonymity has been a topic of discussion since
1884, when the first known gamete donation took place,1 but
the topic remains current. As donor-conceived children reach
the age of majority, empirical research is demonstrating the
need for increased openness.2 In Pratten, the Supreme Court of
British Columbia recently considered whether a child
conceived with the use of an anonymous sperm donor has a

1

R Snowden & GD Mitchell, The Artificial Family (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1981) at 13-14; Eric Blyth & Abigail Farrand,
“Anonymity in donor-assisted conception” (2004) 12 Int’l J Child Rts
89 at 89. It is said that the first known case of assisted insemination donor (AID) was performed at Jefferson Medical College (USA). A
group of students of the medical school discussed how to solve the
difficulties of a couple because of the husband’s azoospermia, and
suggested that the wife be inseminated with the semen of the “bestlooking member of the class”. They did so while the woman was
anaesthetized, without informing her or her husband. After
conception was confirmed the husband was told and, although he was
pleased, he decided not to tell his wife. When the person born by AID
was 25 years old, the student-donor visited him.

2

This paper focuses on legal aspects of the fundamental right to know
one’s biological origins. However, we can mention one recent and
large study on these children, DR Beeson, PK Jennings and W
Kramer, “Offsping searching for their sperm donors: how family type
shapes the process” (2011) 26:9 Human Reproduction, 2415. See also
a comment on this study, Naomi Cahn & Wendy Kramer, “What the
kids really want” BioNews (8 August 2011), online: <www.bionews.o
rg.uk/page_103648.asp>.
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right to identity pursuant to section seven of the Charter.3 The
Court eventually concluded that the equality rights protected by
section 15 of the Charter were violated, and the case is now
before the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In Canada, there
continues to be considerable controversy about the role of
anonymity in gamete donation. In other jurisdictions, it is now
widely accepted that a child should know the identity of his or
her progenitors. In these jurisdictions, the debate has moved on
to exploring whether it is possible, or indeed desirable, for the
donor to have access to information about the child or if the
access to information can be extended to knowledge of the
existence and identities of possible genetic siblings.4
While some national differences exist, the international
trend is toward banning anonymous gamete donation, even in
countries that once staunchly defended it.5 In the past several
3

Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 656. For
more details, see infra note 77.

4

This is the case of some States of Australia and in the United
Kingdom. For Australia, see National Health and Medical Research
Council, The Ethical Guidelines on the use of Assisted Reproductive
Technology in Clinical Practice and Research 2004 (Canberra:
National Health and Medical Research Council, 1996); The Infertility
Treatment Act 1995 (Vic); The Human Reproductive Technology
Amendment Act 2004 (WA); Human Fertilization and Embryology
Act 2008 (WA).

5

“I conclude that international instruments, practice and jurisprudence
have not yet reached the point where it can conclusively be said that
. . . children possess a universal and internationally recognised right
to know their biological parentage, although the tide of opinion is
flowing in that direction.” See Hemmes v Young, [2004] NZCA 289
at para 88. See also chapter 10 of Law Commission – Te Aka Matua
o te Ture, New Issues in Legal Parenthood (Wellington, NZ : Law
Commission, 2005); Michelle Giroux, “Le droit fondamental de
connaître ses origines biologiques” in Tara Collins et al, eds, Rights
of the Child: Proceedings of the International Conference, Ottawa
2007 (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2008) 353 [Giroux, “Le droit
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years, legislative reform recognizing a donor-conceived
person’s right to access information about his or her donors has
occurred in Norway (2003), in the United Kingdom (2004), and
in Finland (2006).6 This worldwide national legislative policy
of banning anonymous gamete donation has permitted a
growing recognition of the right to know one’s biological
origins, which is recognized as a fundamental right by the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
However, in Canada, the right to know one’s biological
origins has not been universally guaranteed through legislation,
either for adoptees or for donor-conceived children. There has
been considerable discussion about its importance, as we
discuss below.7 The need for an explicit guarantee of this right
fondamental”; Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, “Donor-conceived People’s
Access to Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of
Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor
Identity” (2009) 23 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 174.
6

In doing so, these countries adopted legislation like that of Sweden
(1984), Austria (1992), Switzerland (1998), in Australia, Victoria
(1998) and West Australia (2004), Holland (2004), and New Zealand
(2004). These countries either do not allow donor anonymity or had
allowed it in the past but have since abolished it. On the other hand,
Iceland (1997), Portugal (2006) and Belgium (2007) have a doubletrack system that recognizes the donor’s choice between anonymity
and disclosed donation. Canada, Denmark, France, and Greece allow
donor anonymity. Italy does not allow ART with donors at all. Some
South Americans countries, Luxemburg, and a number of other
countries remain silent with respect to this practice. For some
statistics in Europe, see European Society of Human Reproduction
and Embryology, Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted
Reproduction in the EU: Regulation and Technologies (Belgium:
ESHRE, 2008), online at <http://ec.europa.eu/health/blood_tissues_o
rgans/docs/study_eshre_en.pdf>.

7

See the discussion in the province of Quebec around Bill 125 –
Québec Civil Code in Parliamentary Commission : Québec,
Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, 7 (5 septembre 1991) at
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arises from a democratic conception of the family. This is a
new understanding of familial relationships, based upon
equality of family members vis-à-vis one another. It is
encouraged by a re-evaluation of the impact of fundamental
rights in family law and its recognition for all of its members.8
Within this framework, this article builds on the CRC’s
recognition of the right to identity as a fundamental right of the
child.9 We will focus on the importance of recognizing the
254-261, 271, 273; Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats,
30 (5 décembre 1991) at 1231-1242; Québec, Assemblée nationale,
Journal des débats, 33 (10 décembre 1991) at 1333-1335; AP v LD,
[2001] RJQ 16 (CA). At the national level, see Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report of
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies: Volume 1
(Ottawa : Canada Communications Group, 1993); House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Assisted Human
Reproduction: Building Families (December 2001), online: <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/371/HEAL/Reports/RP10320
41/healrp02/healrp02-e.pdf>.
8

With respect to the evolution and changes in the notion of family, see
Mariana De Lorenzi, “Familias ensambladas: ¿Prerrogativa
Heterosexual?” (Paper and lecture delivered at the 11th Meeting of
Civilist Lawyers, Santa Fe, Argentina, August 2001) [De Lorenzi,
“Familias ensambladas”]; Françoise-Romaine Ouellette, Renée Joyal
& Roch Hurtubise, Familles en mouvance: quels enjeux éthiques?
(Québec: PUL, 2005). On the impact of fundamental rights on the
family, see Michelle Giroux, “Les bouleversements du droit de la
famille au Canada et au Québec : illustration à partir du mariage
homosexuel et du droit de connaître ses origines biologiques” (Paper
delivered at a seminar entitled Els drets fonamentals en una societat
intercultural. Els Casos de Canada-Quebec I Espanya-Catalunya A
Debat, Barcelona, Spain, 15-16 June 2006).

9

This will be developed to a greater extent later in the paper. For now,
let us simply mention, as expressed by Jaime Sergio Cerda, “The
Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights” (1990) 12
Hum Rts Q 115, that during the drafting process of the CRC,
everyone agreed that this right existed. However, it is also worth
mentioning that there is no unanimity on the issue. See Angela
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right to know one’s origins at the provincial level,10 with an
emphasis on the Civil Code of Québec.11 While this article
primarily refers to Québec legislation, it can assist legislative
reform across the country.12
IDENTITY
The Concept of Identity
The word ‘identity’, derived from the Latin term ‘identĭtas’, is
defined as “the state of having unique identifying
characteristics held by no other person or thing.” It is what
makes one special and original. The identity of a person is like
a snapshot of one’s being and feelings; it refers to “the
Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm
Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26:1 Can J
Fam L 95.
10

It is now clear that this issue is within provincial jurisdiction, as the
provisions of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2
[AHRA] on the matter have been invalidated by the Supreme Court of
Canada, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010
SCC 61.

11

Civil Code of Québec, LQ 1991, c 64.

12

The framework for determining parentage in Quebec civil law differs
from the frameworks of other Canadian common law provinces and
territories. Quebec civil law generally states that a donor cannot be
the legal parent of a donor conceived child, but this is not as clearly
enacted in other parts of the country (see infra note 66). To avoid
confusing the question of parentage with the one of knowing one’s
origins, rules determining parentage would need to be reformed
where needed before banning confidentiality. This is very important
to avoid creating difficult hurdles for some families, especially for
lesbian, gay, and single-parent families. See Cameron, Gruben &
Kelly, supra note 9; Fiona Kelly, "(Re)forming Parenthood: The
Assignment of Legal Parentage Within Planned Lesbian Families"
(2009) 40 Ottawa L Rev 185.
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individual characteristics by which a person or thing is
recognized.”13 It is what makes every human being a unique
entity14 that can be individualized in society.
Within this general understanding, identity is
composed of two distinct parts: one “dynamic” and the other
“static”. The first refers to those characteristics (for example,
intellectual, moral, cultural, religious, political, and
professional) that are in constant flux. These characteristics
enable us to distinguish one person from another in the social
milieu. The static sphere, perpetual and immutable, alludes to a
group of attributes that make one visible to the outside world
(for example, image, physical features, name, birth
information, sex, parenthood, genetic heritage, and nationality).
These characteristics allow an observer to obtain an immediate
first impression. One’s genetic heritage is located within the
“static aspect” of one’s identity.15
The Right to Identity
The “right to identity” can be viewed as the legal protection

13

The Collins English Dictionary, 2d ed, sub verbo “identity”.

14

Fernández Sessarego, Derecho a la Identidad Personal (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Astrea, 1992) at 113. According to Fernández
Sessarrego, it is everything that allows us to identify the individual
within the society and what allows every human being to “be
‘oneself’ (himself or herself) and not ‘someone else’.” In other words,
it is what makes every individual unique and incapable of being
replicated.

15

Ibid at 114. Sarah Wilson, “Identity, Genealogy and the Social
Family: The Case of Donor Insemination” (1997) 11 Int’l JL Pol’y &
Fam 270 at 272, 281-282. Sarah Wilson also defends a dynamic
notion of identity, instead of a monolithic and static one, using the
idea of “narrative identity” as opposed to a “fixed identity” in her
discussion of the importance of genetic ties.
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afforded to the state’s respect for one’s identity.16 To guarantee
the right to identity as a whole, the state must recognize a
child’s right to know his or her genetic origins, which is part of
the static aspect of identity, as well as the right to have a
family, which is part of the dynamic aspect. These two distinct
aspects of identity are recognized by Article 7 of the CRC,17
which states that every child shall have the “right to know” and
to “be cared for by his or her parents.” 18
16

The right to know one’s origins also includes the necessity of hearing
the opinion of the child (Article 12); the right to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, with certain restrictions
(Article 13); the access to information and material which promote
their social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental
health (Article 17); and to enjoy all the rights set forth in the
Convention without discrimination of any kind, with the States taking
all appropriate measures to ensure their protection (Article 2). With
respect to the relationship between anonymity and discrimination, see
Claire Breen, “Poles Apart? The Best Interests of the Child and
Assisted Reproduction in the Antipodes and Europe” (2001) 9 Int’l J
Child Rts 157 at 166.

17

We do not suggest, however, that the right to identity should be
limited to children. The recognition of this right for the child is
reinforcing the idea that every individual - whatever his or her age has the right to know his or her origins. As John Eekelaar has stated:
“it would be a grievous mistake to see the Convention as applying to
childhood alone. Childhood is not an end in itself, but part of the
process of forming the adults of the next generation. The Convention
is for all people. It could influence their entire lives. If its aims can be
realized, the Convention can truly be said to be laying the foundations
for a better world”. See John Eekelaar, “The Importance of Thinking
that Children have Rights” in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker & John
Seymour, eds, Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992) at 234.

18

See Mariana De Lorenzi, “El Desconocimiento del Verdadero
Origen… ¿y el derecho a la identidad? El anonimato del donante de
gametos y preembriones en las técnicas de reproducción humana
asistida” (Diploma in Advanced Studies Thesis, University of
Barcelona, 2007) [unpublished] at 217-221, 300 [De Lorenzi, “El
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Children should be able to know the identity of their
progenitors19 and be cared for by their legal parents.20 The
difference between these two characteristics of identity should
be recognized at law.21 While this distinction may seem simple,
it often generates confusion in the literature. The ability to
access information about the donor’s identity (who is the
progenitor?) and the legal mechanism for proclaiming filiation
(who is the legal parent?) are often conceived of as one issue,
when in fact they are two separate questions with potentially
different answers. Confusion between the two concepts exists,
for example, in a decision in which a child’s right to know her
progenitors is not protected due to a concurrent interest in
maintaining her legal link with her legal parents.
When a child is able to access information about the
identity of a progenitor, the progenitor need not be considered

Desconocimiento del Verdadero Origen”]; Mariana De Lorenzi,“‘¿De
dónde vengo?’ La emblemática pregunta por los orígenes formulada
por los hijos nacidos de técnicas de reproducción humana asistida” in
Carlos Villagrasa Alcaide & Isaac Ravetllat Ballesté, eds, Por los
derechos de la infancia y de la adolescencia: un compromiso mundial
desde el derecho de participación en el XX aniversario de la
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (Barcelona: Bosch, 2009)
797 at 814. [De Lorenzi, “¿De dónde vengo?”].
19

In referring to the progenitors, we may also use the terms “biological
parents” or “genetic parents”. See also infra, the section of this paper
entitled “The Convention on the Rights of the Child”.

20

By legal parents, we refer to the people recognized by law as being
responsible for the upbringing and care of a child. We will discuss, in
the section of this paper entitled “The Convention on the Rights of the
Child”, whether this interpretation is consistent with the CRC.

21

The need for such division has been defended by the Commission of
the European Court of Human Rights in JRM v The Netherlands
(1993), 74 Eur Comm’n HR DR 120.
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the legal parent.22 Additionally, it does not necessitate a social
relationship between the child and the progenitor.23 A
22

As mentioned earlier, legal reforms of parentage frameworks would
be required in some provinces and territories to establish this
distinction. For more details on legal parentage in Canada, see
Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 9. For a discussion of the
distinction between “progenitor” and “legal parent”, see Odile Roy,
“Le droit de connaître ses origines et la Cour européenne des droit de
l’homme: l’affaire Odièvre contre France” in Peter Lodrup & Eva
Modvar, eds, Family Life and Human Rights (Trondheim: Gyldendal
Norsk Forlag, 2004) 606; Julie Wallbank, “The Role of Rights and
Utility in Instituting a Child’s Right to Know her Genetic History”
(2004) 13 Soc & Leg Stud 245 at 260; Jaap Doek, “Article 8: The
Right to Preservation of Identity” in A Commentary of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoof Publishers, 2006) 12. When one talks about ART with a
third-party gamete donor, one is not asking for a legal determination
of the paternity or maternity of the donor; the legal parents of the
child born from the donation are the parents who raise the child
socially. As Odile Roy states, in her comment on Odièvre v France,
no 42326/98, [2003] III ECHR 86, «il ne s’agit pas ici de discuter du
rôle que doivent jouer respectivement les facteurs biologique et
sociologique dans la définition de la filiation». Furthermore, as
Wallbank states, “[u]sually, sperm donors have no desire to act as
fathers. There is no reason to believe that this would change if they
were identifiable.” Asserting a legal relationship with the donor
would also be contrary to the CRC, as a proper interpretation of
Article 8 provides not only the right to know one’s genetic origins,
but also alleviates the donor from any legal or financial responsibility
for the child born from the donation.

23

Wallbank, ibid at 260; Ouellette, Joyal, & Hurtubise, supra note 8 at
391-403. This is underscored in some of the literature. For example,
see Martin Richards, “Assisted Reproduction and Parental
Relationships” in Andrew Bainham et al, eds, Children and their
Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2003) 309. Richards points out that the circumstance of “[k]nowing
the manner of your conception and the identity, and perhaps some
other information, about the gamete provider is not, of course, the
same thing as having a social relationship with that person.In the
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‘progenitor’ is not necessarily a ‘parent’.24 While a ‘progenitor’
is “a direct ancestor”, a ‘parent’ is the “person acting as a father
or mother; guardian.”25 From a legal standpoint, “progenitor”
and “parent” are not synonymous.
For example, within the general parentage framework
in Québec, in most cases, the same person will be both
progenitor and legal parent. One of the legislative criteria to
establish either paternity or maternity is the biological link.
Filiation by blood usually confirms the biological link.26 The
same vein, Wallbank says that “[f]ulfilling the child’s right to know
should not automatically lead to the child having a relationship with
her donor or any other third party”, because “[t]o contribute one’s
genes to the creation of a child is not congruent with the social role of
parenthood.”
24

José Luis Lacruz Berjedo, “La Constitución y los hijos artificiales”
(1987) Actualidad Civil 2031-2039 at 419; Montes Penades & L.
Vicente, “Las categorías negociales en las técnicas de reproducción
asistida” (1994) 4 Actualidad Civil 957-980 at 968; Hernández
Rivero, “Las acciones de filiación y las técnicas de reproducción
asistida” in Lledó Yagüe, ed, Cuadernos de Derecho judicial: “La
filiación: su régimen jurídico e incidencia de la genética en la
determinación de la filiación” (Madrid: CGPJ, 1994) 279. For Québec
civil law, see Jean Pineau & Marie Pratte, La famille (Montréal,
Thémis, 2006) at paras 387ff and 421ff. In Spain, Lacruz Berdejo is
recognized as being the one who established the distinction between
“padre” and “progenitor” based on the socio-cultural and legal sense
of the first term and the biological and genetic sense of the second.
Today, this distinction is accepted and shared by almost all jurists,
thus abandoning the idea of parenthood as a situation defined by the
biological fact.

25

The Collins English Dictionary, supra note 13, sub verdo “parent”,
“progenitor”.

26

It is however factually possible that an individual might have two
progenitors, one gestational progenitor, one legal mother and father,
and even a social mother and father.
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intention to act in fact as a parent (sometimes only after the
child is born) is another foundation. In the context of assisted
reproductive technology, the situation is quite different, and the
intention to become a parent should be the only foundation of
legal parenthood. For this reason, legislation pertaining to ART
generally does not recognize the donor as a parent. In fact, the
law often stipulates that the donor is not the parent. 27
In short, legal parenthood can be determined in
different ways. In some cases, it is determined by biology, and
sometimes, in the case of paternity, by biology combined with
other circumstances, including marriage, civil union, or
cohabitation with the mother.28 In other cases, legal parenthood
will be established by the intention of the person to become a
parent.29 These methods of determining parentage allow
27

In the Canadian context, see Canada, Uniform Child Status Act, 1992,
online <www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u9>. However,
uncertainty remains in some provinces where no legislation has been
enacted on this issue or where the recommendations of the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada have not been universally adopted despite
the adoption of some legislation.

28

Penades & Vicente, supra note 24 at 968. For more details on these
questions in Québec civil law, see Alexandra Obadia, “L’incidence
des tests d’ADN sur le droit québécois de la filiation” (2000) 45
McGill LJ 483. See also Giroux, “Test d’ADN et filiation à la lumière
des développements récents: dilemmes et paradoxes” (2002) 32 RGD
865.

29

Lacruz Berjedo, supra note 24 at 2037; Anne Cadoret, “Constructions
familiales et engagement” in Françoise-Romaine Ouellette, Renée
Joyal & Roch Hurtubise, eds, supra note 8 at 89. The question of
whether the intention to become a parent could be the basis of a legal
bond of parenthood is necessarily affirmative. This is not a new way
of thinking, but has in fact existed since Roman times; it should not
lose its effect simply because of new ways of having children, such as
through ART. The continued use of this question to determine legal
parenthood could indeed be a helpful solution to the problem at hand.
We should not forget that the scope of the will to become a parent is
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recognition of different societal roles.30 The numerous forms in
which families exist today provide an opportunity to broaden
the means of determining parenthood31 to define new legal
categories and to establish more suitable terminology to reflect
these new social realities.32 In this article, we attempt to
establish that legislative policy ought to respect the importance
of establishing an unequivocal parental relationship while also
ensuring the right of the child to have access to information
about his or her biological origins.33
The Recognition of the Right to Identity
The International Trend
Currently, the trend in international law is to recognize that the
right to identity includes the right to know one’s biological
origins.34 A model of the express recognition of this right is the
also wider since it has the ability to not only create the legal
relationship but also to destroy it, as happens with the case of
abandonment.
30

Penades & Vicente, supra note 24 at 968.

31

Francisco Blasco Gascó, “Técnicas de reproducción asistida y
competencia legislativa autonómica” (1991) 4 Revista Jurídica de
Catalunya 953 at 963-964. See also Cadoret, supra note 29 at 89.

32

Francisco Rivero Hernández, “¿Mater semper certa est? Problemas de
la determinación de la maternidad en el Ordenamiento Español” in
Anuario de Derecho Civil, Tomo L, 1997-1, at 17.

33

Eser Albin, MCJ, “La moderna medicina de la reproducción e
ingeniería genética. Aspectos legales y sociopolíticos desde el punto
de vista alemán” in Ingeniería Genética y Reproducción Asistida
(Madrid: Edición de Marino Barbero Santos, 1989) at 281-282. In
this paper, however, we will only deal with the second question.

34

Some international institutions have expressed their worries about the
need to respect the right to know one’s origins. For example, the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, 5th sitting
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights for Future
Generations (Paris, 22 September 1994), which includes, in
Article 4, the right of persons belonging to future generations
to know their personal and collective origins, identity, and
history.35 Despite the absence of an explicit provision
respecting the right of children to their identity in other
conventions, a dynamic interpretation that implicitly recognizes
this right has been adopted by both the organizations in charge
of their application and the literature.36 For example, the
European Court of Human Rights implicitly recognizes the

Recommendation 1443, 2000, 5.vii, about International Adoption
insists that it is a necessity to “ensure the right of adopted children to
learn of their origins at the latest on their majority and to eliminate
from national legislation any clauses to the contrary” (see Doc. 8592,
report
of
the
Social,
Health
and
Family
Affairs
Committee, rapporteur: Mr. About; Doc. 8626, opinion of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mrs.
Wohlwend; and Doc. 8600, opinion of the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Demography, rapporteur: Mrs. Vermot-Mangold). In a
similar way, the Information Document prepared by the Secretariat of
the Economic and Social Committee about Children’s Rights Under
The European Social Charter (18 November 2005) talks about the
right to an identity under the headline “Legal status of the Child”
claiming that “ there must be a right for an adopted child to know his
or her origins (Article 17)”.
35

UNESCO, Executive Board, Session 145 (EX/41), online: < unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0010/001001/100169EO.pdf>.

36

In 1992, the Council of Europe enacted the Resolution on a European
Charter of Rights of the Child (Resolution A3-0172/92, 8 July 1992,
Official Journal of the European Communities No C 241/67; 21
September 1992, 67-73). This document states that children have the
right to have their identity protected and the right to know about their
biological origins. It also lays down the conditions under which such
information will be given to children and recognizes the right of
having parents or people or institutions to take the place of parents if
no parents are available (see Articles 8.10 and 8.11).
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right to identity in article 8 of ECHR, within the right to
privacy.37
While European instruments can assist in the
interpretation of the right to know one’s biological origins in
Canada,38 the CRC is without question the most important
document with a binding character in this country and the first
to expressly recognize this right.39
37

Although there is no specific judgment on the rights of children born
by ART with anonymous donors to know their donors’ identity, the
evolution of the case law is clearly heading in that direction. The
European Court of Human Rights in X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom
[no 21830/93, [1997] II ECHR] stated, in obiter, that there is not a
“shared approach amongst the High Contracting Parties with regard
to the manner in which the social relationship between a child
conceived by AID and the person who performs the role of father
should be reflected in law” and “on the question whether the interests
of a child conceived in such a way are best served by preserving the
anonymity of the donor of the sperm or whether the child should have
the right to know the donor’s identity” (at para 24). However, since
1997, in UK R (On the application of Rose and another) v Sec of
State for Health and another, [2002] EWHC (ADMIN)(2002) 3 FCR
731 (QB Administrative Court), judges determined that this remedy
was available based on ECHR’s precedents. The legislation was
subsequently modified accordingly. See Laurence Brunet, “The
principle of gamete donor anonymity in its social context. An analysis
of the legal theories of identity” (2010) 20:1 Andrologie 92. The
authors of the previous papers have conducted a detailed analysis of
the European case law. For more details, see Giroux, “Le droit
fondamental”, supra note 5 at 371-383 and Mariana De Lorenzi &
Véronica Piñero, “Assisted Human Reproduction Offspring and the
Fundamental Right to Identity: The Recognition of the Right to Know
One’s Origins under the European Convention of Human Rights”
(2009) 6 Personalized Medicine 79.

38

As was demonstrated in Giroux, ibid.

39

See Michael Freeman, “The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child
of the Reproduction Revolution” (1996) 4 Int’l J Child Rts 273 at
283. See our position on the binding character of the CRC, infra note
40.
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child
Canadian legislation should be consistent with the values,
principles and rights of the CRC, to which Canada is a
signatory, specifically with respect to the fundamental right to
identity.40 The CRC stresses the transcendental value of
identity throughout the text (examples include Articles 2.1, 14,
29, 30), but the right to identity is specifically stressed in
paragraphs one of Articles 7 and 8. They read as follows:
Article 7.1: “[t]he child shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and, as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.”
40

See Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 SCR 817; Anne-Marie Trahan, “Les droits de l’enfant, la
Convention des Nations Unies et l’arrêt Baker: une trilogie porteuse
d’espoir” in Benoît Moore, ed, Mélanges Jean Pineau (Montréal:
Thémis, 2003) at 151. All Canadian provinces (except Alberta)
ratified the Convention in 1991. For the Government of Québec, see
Décret no 91-1676, 9/12/1991. Some scholars consider the CRC to be
binding in Canada upon ratification. See Brian R Howe,
“Implementing Children’s Rights in a Federal State: The Case of
Canada’s Child Protection System” (2001) 9 Int’l J Child Rts 361 at
364-365. They argue that even if there is no direct implementation of
the Convention through legislation, which is a condition in the
Canadian dualist system for implementing international law, there has
been an implicit implementation. In fact, in many cases, legislation in
Canada already endorses the values and principles espoused in the
CRC. In that sense, Canada reporting to UN on the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (date of first report to UN: June 17, 1994) shows
consideration and respect for the values and principles of CRC. The
Reports are available online in the website of the Human Rights
Program, Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, online:
<www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pdp-hrp/>. We are ready to endorse such an
approach.
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Article 8.1: “States Parties undertake to respect
the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name and family
relations as recognized by law without
unlawful interference.”41
In this paper, we will analyze both of these articles,
which confirm the recognition of different aspects of identity,
such as nationality, name, knowledge of one’s own origins, and
parental relationships. We will demonstrate that the notion of
identity embedded in the CRC is rich and includes genetic
heritage, as well as familial relationships; its premise is that the
best interests of children tend to lie in knowing their parents
and in being cared for by them. These two articles have the
common objective of ensuring that a respect for identity is a
fundamental right. While Article 7.1 offers an integral
protection of the right to identity by recognizing both its
dynamic and static aspects, Article 8.1 reaffirms the State’s
duty to protect this right. 42
We will discuss how a deeper analysis of these
provisions reveals four points. First, Articles 7 and 8
demonstrate that recognition of the rights of children, in
general, and of their right to identity, in particular, is always in
their best interests. This means that the right to identity and the
best interests of the child should not be viewed as
41

Emphasis added.

42

The illustrative character of the enumeration has been defended by
Doek, supra note 22 at 8, 11-12; Jaime Sergio Cerda, supra note 9;
Douglas Hodgson, “The International Legal Protection of the Child’s
Right to a Legal Identity and the Problem of Statelessness” (1993) 7
Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 255 at 265; and Geraldine Van Bueren, The
International Law on the Rights of the Child - International Studies in
Human Rights, vol 35 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)
at 119.
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irreconcilable. They can be, and indeed are, compatible and
complementary.43 While the best interests of the child are the
paramount consideration in all cases, recognizing and giving
effect to a child’s right to identity lies in the child’s best
interests.
The drafters of the Convention did not consider
circumstances involving assisted reproduction technology.
However, as Freeman states:

43

Ineta Ziemele, “Article 7: The Right to Birth Registration, Name and
Nationality, and the Right to Know and Be Cared for by Parents” in A
Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) at 26-27; Rachel
Hodgkin & Peter Newell, Implementation Handbook for the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 1998) at 105-106.
With respect to the relations between the expression “as far as
possible” and “the best interests of the child” principle, there are two
different views. While some authors defend the idea that the
limitation should be read in accordance with Article 3, others state
that it does not refer to the best interests of the child. The risk of
subscribing to the first theory is that it is too subjectivist and could
deny the right of the child to know his or her own origins. Ziemele
explains that although all circumstances need to be weighed, “an
absolute prohibition on the right to know biological parents is
contrary to the CRC”. On the other hand, some authors maintain that
Article 7 does not make reference to the best interests of the child and
that the expression “as far as possible” “appear[s] to provide a much
stricter and less subjective qualification” than the former, and that
“[t]he words imply children are entitled to know their parentage if
this is possible, even if this is deemed to be against their best
interests”. An intermediate position, such as the one we are proposing
and explained above, states that although there is a close relationship
between the best interests of the child and the right to identity, the
principle of Article 3 cannot be used as an excuse to refuse the
recognition of the right to identity, which is a fundamental right. To
interpret the right to identity as against the best interests of the child
would be a contradiction.
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[I]n other areas where the child’s interests
conflict with those of others, we treat the child’s
interests as paramount . . . why not in this
context too? . . . Why should we protect the
donor at the child’s expense? It is yet just
another example of a silencing of the child’s
voice.44
In the context of disclosure of genetic heritage, the best
interests of the child must again be the primary consideration.
That means that “[o]ther considerations such as parental rights
or the privacy of the family must be secondary.”45 The function
of Article 3, therefore, is to strengthen the right of the child to
know their biological origins even when this right conflicts
with parental rights.46
Second, the use of the word ‘parents’ in reference to
both the right to know and the right to be cared for can generate
some difficulties in interpretation. Even if the word ‘parents’ in
the context of Article 7.1 is used in relation to the right to
know, it should be understood as meaning ‘progenitors’ to refer
to those who are involved in the procreation of the child.
However, if the term ‘parents’ is used in relation with the right
to be cared for, it should be interpreted to refer to those who
are responsible for the care and upbringing of the child after
birth.

44

Freeman, supra note 39 at 283-288, especially 288; Howe, supra note
40 at 366, 380.

45

Howe, ibid.

46

Hodgkin & Newell, supra note 43 at 113. Thus children’s best
interests and senses of identity may be sustained without having to
deny them knowledge of their origins, for example through ‘secret’
adoptions or anonymous egg/sperm donations and so forth (see also
Article 7, page 106).
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In most cases, the progenitors will also be the parents.47
In other circumstances, the best interests of the child warrant a
different result, as is the case with adoption (Article 21a)48 as
well as with assisted reproduction if a donor is used. In the
latter circumstance, the CRC guarantees the child’s right to
know his or her genetic origins (‘the progenitors’) as well as
the right to be cared for by the recipients of the donation (‘the
parents’).49
Thirdly, the expression “as far as possible” in Article
7.1 of the CRC, which circumscribes both the right to know
and the right to be cared for by the ‘parents’,50 warrants some
comment.51 In our view, the expression “as far as possible”
47

This idea and the ones that follow are extensively developed in De
Lorenzi, “Familias ensambladas”, supra note 8 at 6.

48

In case of adoption, Article 7.1 should be translated as the right of the
child to know his or her biological parents and to be cared for by his
or her adoptive parents, and also, when it applies, to know his or her
psychological parents. See Hodgkin & Newell, supra note 43 at 105,
where they assert that the definition of “parents” includes, as well as
genetic and birth parents, “the child’s psychological parents” as a
third category which recognizes the child’s right to know the people
who had cared for him or her during significant periods of life, such
as childhood or infancy.

49

Doek, supra note 22 at 10-12; Cerda, supra note 9 at 117; Lucy Frith,
“Gamete Donation and Anonymity. The Ethical and Legal Debate”
(2001) 16 Human Reproduction 818 at 820-821. The application of
Article 7 to the right of a child to know his or her gamete donor’s
identity has been upheld by the Austria’s Medically Assisted
Procreation Act 1992, by the Swiss Constitution, the Western
Australia’s Select Committee, etc.

50

In the same sense, see Hodgkin & Newell, supra note 43 at 107.

51

For more details, see De Lorenzi, “El Desconocimiento del
Verdadero Origen,” supra note 18 at 197-198; De Lorenzi, “¿De
dónde vengo?” supra note 18 at 804; and Giroux, “Le droit
fondamental”, supra note 5 at 353.
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refers only to a circumstance involving a factual impossibility,
where the traditional or usual situation contemplated by the
regulation is absent. It does not refer to a legal impossibility. In
most cases, the child will be conceived via a sexual relationship
between two people (‘natural’ conception) who will both be
related to the child, both genetically and biologically and
through a social bond. Those two people will become the legal
parents and will rear the child. When a child is born outside of
these circumstances, it may not be factually possible to give
effect to the child’s right to know his or her progenitors. There
are several potential factual impossibilities.
The first is when the biological parents cannot be
identified or located, either because they have voluntarily
abandoned the child or because they have been separated
involuntarily, by war, catastrophe, or accident. In such a case, it
will not be factually possible for the child to know his or her
own progenitors, much less be cared for by them.
The situation described above is wholly different from
circumstances in which it is impossible for the progenitors to
care for the child (when the child is placed for adoption, for
example) or when the progenitors donate their gametes without
intending to be parents. In these cases, if a registry and certain
other measures are in place, it is not factually impossible for
children to know the identity of their biological parents or
donors, even though these biological parents and donors will
not raise them. If the law does not allow for the child to have
access to information concerning the donor, it would be a legal
impossibility, not a factual one. In our view, a legal
impossibility is not an argument that warrants the denial of
access to one’s own biological origins or a refusal to recognize
a fundamental right.
In order to better understand how the phrase “as far as
possible” should be interpreted, it is worth considering the
legislative history of the CRC and the obligation to interpret
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the CRC “in the light of its object and purpose”, as required by
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.52 On one hand, some
arguments provide justification for its inclusion in the wording
of Article 7.1. Legislative history suggests that the qualification
“as far as possible” was included to reassure State parties
involved in the drafting process that their national laws
allowing secret adoption, abortion, genetic engineering
experiments, or anonymous in vitro fertilization with donors
were in conformity with the CRC.53
52

Article 31 (General rule of interpretation) states:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that
the parties so intended.

53

Hodgson, supra note 42 at 264-265; Cerda, supra note 9 at 116;
United Nations, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Volume I, United Nations, Office of the United Nations,
High Commissioner for Human Rights, New York and Geneva, 2007
at 378, online: <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Legislative
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However, if one looks at the “object and purpose” of
the CRC, it is clear that the intent of the legislator was to
recognize an unqualified right to identity.54 Enunciated in
Article 7, the right to identity was strengthened by the adoption
of Article 8.1.55 Norway 56 questioned the necessity of including
Historycrc1en.pdf>. It is worth viewing the Legislative History of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child to see how the German
Democratic Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
the United States of America drew attention to the fact that their laws
allow “secret adoption” and pointed out that “the right to know one’s
parents” could not be applied everywhere. Portugal agreed with those
considerations.
54

Wilson, supra note 15 at 278ff. Article 8 was introduced by the
Argentinean delegation in 1985 and it was discussed and finally
adopted by the Working Group in 1986 with some changes. The
initiative was inspired by the manipulation and suppression of the
identity of approximately 500 children after they had been abducted
from their biological parents during the Argentinean Military
Dictatorship (1976-1983). As a consequence of the approximately
30,000 victims of the “Dirty War”, Argentina has developed different
associations, formed by the relatives of disappeared people in order to
recover their families and, in the course of the time, the identity of the
children abducted from them. The fate of some of the children born in
captivity was different, but most children were taken from their
mothers and sent to orphanages or abducted by members of the
security forces, “appropriated” and registered as biological sons or
daughters of their families or of families sympathetic to the security
forces. This lamentable history is the reason that Argentina fought so
vigorously for the incorporation of Article 8 in the CRC. For more
information, visit the websites of “Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia
contra el Olvido y el Silencio” (HIJOS), online: <www.agrupacionhij
os.tk>; “Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo”, online: <www.mad
res.org>; and “Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo”, online: <www.abuelas.o
rg.ar>.

55

George Stewart, “Interpreting the Child’s Right to Identity in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child” (1992) 26 Fam LQ 221 at
225.
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Article 8 in the Convention because the true and genuine
personal identity of the child was already embodied in other
norms within the Convention.57 The significance of including
Article 8 was stressed by Argentina, which explained that
while other articles also refer to this issue, particularly Article
7, they do so only in general terms. The importance of Article 8
lies in the special protection that the State must provide “to the
child as soon as possible, when the right of the child to
preserve his or her true identity had been violated, and from the
distinction made between the child’s true and genuine identity
and his or her legal one.”58 The absence of statements to the
contrary shows, as Stewart emphasizes, that there was “no
challenge to the importance of the right under discussion”59 and
that while the right to know one’s origins is included in Article
7, its preservation (as a sphere of the right to identity) is
regulated in Article 8. Hence, the interpretation of both sections
in concert with one another could lead only to the recognition
of an unqualified right to identity, except if it is factually
impossible. Legal impossibility orchestrated by any national
legislation is insufficient to deny the right to know one’s
identity.
As Doek stated: “the Convention is a living instrument
and its interpretation should reflect new developments that may
arise in the area of children’s rights.”60 Therefore, a dynamic
56

The question of Norway was also supported by Netherlands, Canada,
the United States, and Austria.

57

See United Nations, Legislative History of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 53 at 384 (34, 36, 37).

58

Ibid at 35.

59

Stewart, supra note 55 at 223.

60

Doek, supra note 22; Cerda asserts that Article 8 can serve a larger
interest than what was considered when it was drafted, supra note 9 at
117.

78

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 27, 2011]

interpretation of Articles 7 and 8, supported by the history of
the CRC, confirms the existence of a right to identity.
Similarly, Cerda, while defending Article 8, stated the
following:
In the future, Article 8 should perhaps be
interpreted independently of the author’s
intentions or motivations. The nature of the new
right created by this article will, in fact depend
on the development of the legal systems of the
countries concerned rather than on the specific
phenomenon that initially prompted the
sponsoring countries to introduce this new
idea.61
Fourthly, Article 8.1 directs signatory states to regard
the right to identity “as recognized by law without unlawful
interference”. This recognition of the right to identity should be
in accordance with either “national or international law”. The
use of this specific wording was interpreted as giving priority
to international law where national law is more restrictive than
international law.62 In other words, national law cannot be
more restrictive than, or contrary to, the CRC, which
recognizes a right to identity.
THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO IDENTITY: THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PROVINCES
Although the provincial and territorial authorities have the
responsibility of guaranteeing the right to identity, they have
61

Cerda, ibid at 116-117.

62

Van Bueren, supra note 42 at 119; Hodgkin & Newell, supra note 43
at 114. See also Stewart, supra note 55 at 225, who states that,
“[elsewhere] in the Convention, where national law [only] is
intended, the limitation is explicit”. Stewart cites the examples of
Articles 7.2, 12.2, and 20.2.
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yet to recognize this right. To illustrate how this question could
be dealt with at the provincial and territorial level, in a manner
consistent with Canada’s obligations under the CRC, we will
discuss the civil law of Quebec as well as the law of other
Canadian jurisdictions.
The Absence of Recognition in Québec Civil Law
In Québec, the filiation of children conceived through assisted
procreation is addressed in Chapter I.1 of Title two (Filiation)
of the Civil Code (CCQ). Before considering the specific
regulations governing ART, it is worth mentioning some
general rules. Among other principles, the best interests of the
child principle is said to be central to the decision-making
process relating to a child.63 In addition, it is understood to be
the prerogative of the parents to decide whether to tell their
child that he or she has been conceived through use of a
donor.64 However, the state should not use this prerogative to
63

Article 33 states that: “every decision concerning a child shall be
taken in light of the child's interests and the respect of his rights.
Consideration is given, in addition to the moral, intellectual,
emotional and physical needs of the child, to the child's age, health,
personality and family environment, and to the other aspects of his
situation.”

64

Article 597ff CCQ. See also Monique Ouellette, “The civil code of
Quebec and new reproductive technologies” in Research Studies of
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, ed,
Overview of Legal Issues in New Reproductive Technologies
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) at 710.
According to the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medically
Assisted Procreation (Working Paper 65) (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1992) at 169, one cannot impose on the
parents the duty to divulge the details of their child’s origins, as it
might be considered an unconstitutional infringement on the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning their
children. In any case, the respect of such a rule could remain utopian.
In a case dealing with adoption, the Court insisted that the adoptive
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avoid recognizing the right to identity. Parents have an
obligation to respect this fundamental right, and public policies
ought to help parents become more conscious of the
importance of the right of offspring to know their progenitors.65
On the question of ART more specifically, article
538.2 CCQ states that “the contribution of genetic material for
the purposes of a third-party parental project does not create
any bond of filiation between the contributor and the child born
of the parental project”. Donations of gametes and embryos are
included in the definition of “genetic material”, provided that
the donation is gratuitous in nature, as stated in article 25 CCQ.
Furthermore, under Québec civil law, donors bear no legal or
financial responsibility for a child born through gamete
donation; this differs from the law in other Canadian
jurisdictions, as not every province has legislation protecting
sperm donors against claims of paternity.66 Article 541 CCQ
parents have the implicit duty (even if article 632 CCQ (1980) does
not force it) to tell the child about his or her adoptive status, Droit de
la famille 657, [1989] RJQ 1693 (CQ).
65

For instance, in Australia, it is recommended that prospective parents
carefully consider accepting donations from relatives:
If clinics provide treatment involving gamete
donation from a relative, they must encourage
very careful consideration of all relevant issues
(in particular, that it is unethical to mislead a
child about the identity of his or her genetic
parent(s), and that relationships within families
can be confused by cross-generational
donations).
National Health and Medical Research Council, supra note 4,
Guideline 6.7.

66

Along with Quebec, only Alberta,
the Yukon have such legislation.
and Labrador nor the Yukon has
vitro embryo donors. New Alberta

Newfoundland and Labrador, and
However, neither Newfoundland
legislation protecting ovum or in
legislation, which came into force
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stipulates that surrogacy arrangements are considered to be
against public order and are thus void.67
With respect to the question of information concerning
the origins of a child born through assisted reproduction
technology, article 542 CCQ recognizes confidentiality of
donor identity as a guiding principle.68 It is thus impossible for
the donor conceived, under current Québec law, to obtain
information relating to the identity of their progenitors.
Nevertheless, there is an exception to this rule. Article 542
CCQ in fine allows a person born of ART (or descendant of
such a person) to search for health information,69 if it is to
in December 2008, deals with the parental rights of ovum and in vitro
embryo donors; see the Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 12. See
also Katherine Van Heugten & Judy Hunter, “Assisted Human
Reproduction” in Government of Canada, A Brave New World:
Where Biotechnology and Human Rights Intersect (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 2005) at 2-18. For more details on other
Canadian jurisdictions, see Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 9.
67

For more details on surrogacy in Québec, see Michelle Giroux, “Le
recours controversé à l’adoption pour établir la filiation de l’enfant né
d’une mère porteuse: entre ordre public contractuel et intérêt de
l’enfant” (2011) 70 R du B 509. For details on other Canadian
jurisdictions, see Karen Busby and Delaney Vun, “Revisiting The
Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on
Surrogate Mothers” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 13.

68

Article 542 CCQ: “Nominative information relating to medically
assisted procreation is confidential.”

69

Ouellette, supra note 64 at 707; Benoît Moore, “Quelle famille pour
le XXIe siècle?: Perspectives québécoises” (2003) 20 Can J Fam L 57
at 70; Édith Deleury, “Le droit de la procréation artificielle au
Québec présent et futur” in Claudine Bourg, ed, L’infertilité
Procréation médicalement assistée Adoption, filiation Questions
éthiques, psychologiques, juridiques et scientifiques (Bruxelles: De
Boeck-Wesmael, 1992) 104; Pineau & Pratte, supra note 24 at 298ff;
Jacques Beaulne, “Réflexions sur quelques aspects de la procréation
médicalement assistée en droit des personnes et de la famille” (1995)
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prevent a serious threat to his or her health. In that situation,
non-identifying information may be transmitted to medical
authorities, but only through a tribunal.70
Therefore, while offspring may eventually obtain some
information concerning the donor, it is as a consequence of the
right to health, not as a consequence of the right to identity. In
fact, according to the strict wording of paragraph two of article
542 CCQ, no information relating to the identity of the donor
should ever be divulged to the offspring.
As there is no specific provincial regulation on the
collection and retention of information related to ART,71 one
must rely on the ethical standards of each clinic and their
decisions as to what information should be kept. While a bill
on the topic of assisted reproduction has been adopted in the
Québec National Assembly,72 it will not change the current
26 RGD 235 at 262. As for the definition of the words “health of a
person”, used in article 542 CCQ, it can be interpreted in light of the
case law on adoption as including “psychological health”’. However,
this interpretation is limited, due to the fact that according to article
542 CCQ, the transmission of the health information is to be nonnominative in nature and is to be divulged only to the medical
authorities.
70

Article 542 CCQ states: “however, where the health of a person born
of medically assisted procreation or of any descendant of that person
could be seriously harmed if the person were deprived of the
information requested, the court may allow the information to be
transmitted confidentially to the medical authorities concerned. A
descendant of such a person may also exercise this right where the
health of that descendant of a close relative could be seriously harmed
if the descendant were deprived of the information requested”.

71

For general rules of Québec civil law on the question, namely the
question of privacy, see articles 35ff CCQ.

72

Fédération du Québec pour le planning des naissances, Mémoire de la
Fédération du Québec pour le planning des naissances, presented to
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policy on the question of origins. Confidentiality is still the
rule.
Legislators have discussed the question of biological
origins in Canada and Québec in the context of both adoption
and ART.73 Generally, the right of offspring to know their
biological origins has been diminished in favour of the rights of
donors and parents. Furthermore, when information has been
disclosed, it has been justified by health concerns.74

Québec, Commission des affaires sociales de l’Assemblée nationale,
March 2006; Journal des débats de la Commission des affaires
sociales, Professor Edith Deleury of Université Laval, testimony, 30
March 2006, vol 39, no 6. Conseil de la famille et de l’enfance, Avis.
Prendre en compte la diversité des familles (Québec, Conseil de la
famille et de l’enfance, 2005). See also Bill 26, An Act respecting
clinical and research activities relating to assisted procreation, 1st
Sess, 39th Leg), Quebec, 2009 (first presented as Bill 89 (adopted in
principle 14 April 2005, 2nd Sess, 37th Leg and re-introduced as Bill
23 (1st Sess, 38th Leg). Nevertheless, an important addition has been
introduced in section 40, which specifies that information relating to
ART should be kept on a permanent basis by people who exercise
such activities. This section responds to some of the criticism that has
been formulated before the Commission that studied Bill 89.
73

For more details in the province of Québec, see National Assembly,
Journal des débats, 7 (5 September 1991) at p 254-261, 271, 273;
Québec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 30 (5 December
1991) at p 1231-1242; Québec, National Assembly, Journal des
débats, 33 (10 December 1991) at p 1333-1335. See also discussions
on Bill 125 before the Québec National Assembly, where it is
assumed that there is such a right in the context of adoption or ART.
In contrast with other Canadian jurisdictions, confidentiality in the
context of adoption is still the rule in Québec (article 582 CCQ).
Article 583 enables an adopted person, under certain conditions, to
find his or her parents and article 584 allows an adopted person or a
close relative to obtain, under certain conditions, health information.

74

See, for example, the wording of article 542 CCQ.
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Neither Quebec nor Canada has expressly recognized
the right to identity as an autonomous 75 and fundamental
right.76 Even if offspring were to win a court challenge
asserting a right to know one’s origins, either on the basis of a
right to physical or psychological health or on the basis of the
principle of non-discrimination, as was the case in Pratten v.
British Columbia (Attorney General),77 it would be preferable
75

Due to the complexity of the right to identify, which is typical of the
sphere that it regulates, this right has points of contact with several
other rights, such as the rights to privacy, to health, to physical
integrity, honour, and name, among others, and principles, such as
dignity and the free development of the personality, among others.
Some of these rights have obtained legal recognition before the right
to identity, and their gradual recognition created a system in which
these rights comprise aspects of the right to identify. A violation of
the right to identity can thus implicate the violation of other rights.

76

Elton B Klibanoff, “Genealogical Information in Adoption: The
Adoptees Quest and the Law” (1977) 11 Fam LQ 185 at 191. The
qualification of the right to identity as a fundamental right existed as
early as 1977.

77

On the matter of discrimination, the recent case of Pratten v British
Columbia (Attorney General), supra note 3, is interesting. In this
case, Olivia Pratten was conceived via an anonymous sperm donor in
1981. Pratten later went to the doctor who had performed the
insemination seeking information about her donor. However, the
doctor said he had not been obligated to keep records for a patient for
more than six years after the last entry recorded. Therefore, Pratten
claimed that the province allowed the destruction of the files,
depriving her of basic personal information necessary for her physical
and psychological health. The province had enacted the Adoption Act
and the Adoption Regulation, whereby information about the
biological origins and family history of adoptees was gathered and
preserved in order for them to eventually obtain that information.
Pratten alleged discrimination against donor offspring, as compared
to adoptees. She also made an argument that her rights under section
7 of the Charter, the right to liberty and security, were violated by the
province’s failure to enact legislation protecting fundamental aspects
of their personal autonomy and health, also claiming a right to the
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to have a clear policy on the matter.78 Governments should not
wait until a judicial decision has been issued to react. They
should be proactive and legislate on the question as soon as
possible. It is the responsibility of the state to do so.
The Responsibility of Canada Under the CRC
The right to identity means that all measures that allow people
to know their origins and to form their identities must be taken.
This right also entails the obligation of states to respect and
guarantee it.79 This responsibility is both passive and active:
passive in the sense of not interrupting, hiding, or denying any
licit act made in favour of the right to identity and not hiding or
falsifying any information in relation to it; and active, in the
sense of removing obstacles and facilitating the means to make
the right effective.80
identity. The section 7 claim was dismissed. However, on the matter
of discrimination under section 15 of the Charter, the court held that
the omission of donor offspring from the benefits and protections
provided to adoptees under the Adoption Act and Adoption
Regulation created a distinction between adoptees and donor
offspring. Therefore, the omission of donor offspring from the
provisions of the legislation was discriminatory (except for
subsections 4(1)(e) to 4(1)(h)). Moreover, the court held that the
legislation was perpetuating stereotypes about donor offspring.
78

This is what we have argued in the past; see Giroux, “Le droit
fondamental”, supra note 5 at 353.

79

Cerda, supra note 9 at 116, states that “under Article 8 it is mandatory
for states to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity. The purpose of this obligation is to establish an explicit
safeguard against the unlawful intervention of the state”.

80

See Howe, supra note 40 at 364 and Cerda, supra note 9 at 116. The
responsibility of the states, as Howe shows, has changed due to the
rise of new concepts, such as the child as an existing person, and not
just as an object of protection. Howe also cites the increasing
recognition of the fundamental rights of the child, replacing the
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As stated in Article 4 of the CRC, Canada has a duty to
undertake “ all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the
present Convention.” In particular, upon signing the
Convention, the states have three obligations: to supervise the
application of the right to identity, to respect it, and to remedy
any illegal deprivation of it. While Article 7.2 imposes the first
obligation,81 the other two are stipulated in Article 8 by
paragraphs one and two82 respectively.83
The Second Report of Canada to United Nations on the
CRC (2001) underlines the importance of the CRC in the
development and implementation of children’s rights in

paternalistic notion of children’s welfare. “Such a concept of
children’s rights is much more demanding of state and parental action
than the traditional concept of child welfare. . . . The language of
rights works to make the protection of children a more imperative
undertaking”. As Cerda maintains, there is a new obligation for the
States to provide “a legal mechanism for the reestablishment of the
child’s identity”.
81

Article 7.2 states: States Parties shall ensure the implementation of
these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field,
in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

82

Article 8.2 states: Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of
the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide
appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing
speedily his or her identity.

83

For the consequences of the signature of the CRC in Spain, see De
Lorenzi, “El Desconocimiento del Verdadero Origen”, supra note 18,
especially Chapter VI for discussion of the conflict between the rights
of the donor and the offspring and the coherence between the Spanish
law and Constitution.
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Canada.84 Similarly, the Interim Report of the Senate Human
Rights Committee (2005) stresses the absence of direct
implementation of the CRC into domestic law and the
existence of gaps in its implementation: “Canada must begin to
take its international human rights treaty obligations more
seriously.”85
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN) (2003)
has also expressed concern about the lack of respect shown to
the right to know one’s origins, as anonymous births, secret
adoptions, and medically assisted reproduction with
anonymous donors remain the status quo in Canada. For these
reasons, the Committee recommended the adoption of
Canadian legislation that would respect Articles 7 and 8 of the
CRC.86 The Canadian Senate Committee on Human Rights
84

Canadian Heritage, Canada’s Second Report on the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 26 April 2001, online: <www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/
pdp-hrp/docs/crc-2001/index-eng.cfm>. See also Canada’s Third and
Fourth Reports on the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
November 2011, online: <www.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/docs/pdf/canada34-crc-reports-nov2009-eng.pdf>.

85

Canada, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights,
Children: The Silenced Citizens. Effective Implementation Of
Canada’s International Obligations With Respect To The Rights Of
Children (Ottawa: Senate, 2007) at ix.

86

Concluding observations that the Committee on the Rights of the
Child to Canada, 34th Session, CRC/C/15/Add.215, 27 October
2003, paragraphs 30 and 31, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
995a15056ca61d16c1256df000310995/$FILE/G0344648.pdf>. It is
possible to find some examples in the concluding observations that
the Committee on the Rights of the Child made to several countries,
such as France (36th Session, CRC/C/15/Add.240, 30 June 2004) at
paras 23-24, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/317ab54d16e0e6
aac1256bdd0026bd27/f77a0c288462b9efc1256f33003c8c0a/$FILE/
G0442428.pdf>; Norway (6th Session, CRC/C/15/Add.23, 25 April
1994) at para 10, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9fa4
25c091d1b821412561510038866f?Opendocument>; Denmark (8th
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agreed with the UN Committee. In its Report, that Committee
stated that “[c]hildren have a right to their own identity - to
know who they are - and this right is not always being
effectively protected in Canada”87 and “that the best interests of
the child are not being served by current adoption and donor
insemination policies across the country.”88 Canadians
conceived through the use of donor gametes are entitled to the
creation, preservation, and disclosure of their genetic origins
and their donors’ identities. It is imperative that provincial and
territorial authorities in Canada give effect to this right.
Reform is Needed, to Put Children’s Rights First
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Renvoi, decided that action
must take place at the provincial level. Hence, provincial
Session, CRC/C/15/Add.33, 15 February 1995) at para 11, online: <
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ebe7468a5e679788412561510
060c3a2?Opendocument)>; and Luxembourg (8th Session,
CRC/C/15/Add.92, 24 June 1998 at paras 11, 29, online:
<www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/62258a94c261c93180256624
00376374?Opendocument)>. Of the eleven countries that the
UNCRC’s Concluding Observations (2003) published as revealing
specific reference to donor anonymity in ART, only four forbid the
disclosure of the donors (Denmark, France, Greece, and Spain). The
other seven (Austria, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) have abolished the
concealing of donor’s identities. We could also mention Australia (in
Victoria in 1998 and in Western Australia in 2004) and Finland
(2006). For more information, see Blyth & Farrand, supra note 1 at
96ff.
87

Canada, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, supra
note 85 at 113.

88

Ibid at 110-114. To arrive to this last conclusion, the Canadian Senate
Committee collected specialized, technical information that suggests
several disadvantages for the health and well-being of children who
lack access to their donors’ identities.
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legislation89 should be modified to ban anonymity in the
context of gamete donation where it is currently the rule. For
example, article 542 CCQ must be amended to recognize the
right to identity.
The recognition of the right to identity requires that
information be created, preserved, and then disclosed. As a
practical matter, this entails the establishment of a registry as a
repository of information.90 It also entails the collection of
89

For an example of the Quebec provincial legislation on the regulation
of assisted reproduction, see An Act respecting clinical and research
activities relating to assisted procreation, supra note 72. See also the
existing uniform legislation Uniform Child Status Act of April 1992,
online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u9>. However,
the statute would need to be amended to provide for provinces and
territories to record accurately the facts of conceptions and all
participants and to ensure a mechanism is put in place for offspring to
have access to all documents relevant to their conception and genetic
parentage, including medical information. Additionally, it would need
to provide for mental health counseling.

90

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, supra
note 7 at 21. In its report on a draft of the AHRA, the Committee was
astonished by the fact that there was no proof that sperm banks in
Canada hold detailed information on donors and on the use of the
gametes. This situation has been often criticized; see Ouellette, supra
note 64 at 707; Canadian Law Reform Commission, supra note 64 at
168; and Roxanne Mykitiuk & Elizabeth Sloss, “The Challenge of the
New Reproductive Technologies to Family Law” in Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Legal and Ethical
Issues in Reproductive Technologies: Pregnancy and Parenthood
(Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1993) 339 at 431-432. For more details
on the privacy issues in respect of people born through the use of
ART, see Eugene Leon Oscapella, “Overview of Canadian laws
relating to privacy and confidentiality in the medical context” in
Research Studies of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, ed, Overview of Legal Issues in New Reproductive
Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1993) at 231, 232. The Canadian Law Reform Commission was of

90
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current information about the donor, rather than only
preserving information on the ultimate recipients of the
donated gametes and those to whom they give birth, which is
what the now invalid federal legislation aimed to do.91 The law
must also empower and require registry personnel to advise
people that they might be genetically related.92 Such
information can help people avoid incest, especially in the
present context, as the number of times a person can donate is
unregulated and there could be “overuse” of one particular
donor’s gametes. Proper regulation would also limit the
number of children conceived by the same donor.93
Other matters under provincial jurisdiction, such as
parental authority and birth registration, must also be
addressed. Québec has legislated on issues relating to donors
the opinion that information relating to the identity of the parties
should be kept separately from the medical file.
91

Section 17 states: the Agency shall maintain a personal health
information registry containing health reporting information about
donors of human reproductive material and in vitro embryos, persons
who undergo assisted reproduction procedures and persons conceived
by means of those procedures.

92

It might prove useful to look at the now invalid subsection 18(4) of
the AHRA on that point.

93

Guideline 6.3.1 of Australia’s Ethical Guidelines on the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research,
supra note 4 recommends that: Gametes from one donor should be
used in a limited number of families. In deciding the number of
families, clinicians should take account of: the number of genetic
relatives that the persons conceived using the donation will have; the
risk of a person conceived with donor gametes inadvertently having a
sexual relationship with a close genetic relative (with particular
reference to the population and ethnic group in which the donation
will be used); the consent of the donor for the number of families to
be created; and whether the donor has already donated gametes at
another clinic.
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and parental rights and has established, in Article 538.2 CCQ,
that they do not have parental rights and responsibilities toward
the offspring. Reciprocally, children do not have rights or
responsibilities towards donors. Yet not all provinces have
done so and should act urgently.94 Additionally, despite the fact
that it is the prerogative of parents to decide to tell their
children the truth about their conception, other methods, like
the child’s birth certificate and counseling95 could be used to
facilitate transparency and truth.
94

Canada Law Reform Commission, supra note 64 at 110-115. In
finishing their report, the Committee provided Recommendation 11,
which states: “Pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on the
Right of the Child, the Committee recommends that the federalprovincial-territorial negotiations on adoption proposed in
Recommendation 10 should include consideration of access to a
biological parent’s identity and of the benefits of identity disclosure
vetos. The Committee also recommends that Assisted Human
Reproduction Canada review the legal and regulatory regime
surrounding sperm donor identity and access to a donor’s medical
history to determine how the best interests of the child can better be
served” (see especially 109, 115).

95

Eric Blyth, Caroline Jones & Jennifer M Speirs, “The role of birth
certificates in relation to access to biographical and genetic history in
donor conception” (2009) 17 Int’l J Child Rts 207. The Australian
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in
Clinical Practice and Research, supra note 4, states, at Guideline 9.1,
that:
To make informed decisions about their treatment, participants in
ART need to understand all the procedures involved, including any
health risks and psychosocial consequences associated with them.
Clinics must give up-to-date, objective, accurate information about
treatment options and the procedures involved to all potential
participants in ART procedures and discuss it with them. . . .
These rules also take into account the fact that:
Donors and recipients in gamete or embryo donor programs (see
Sections 6 and 7) each have complex information needs. Clinics must
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Will those conceived by donor gametes under a past
regime of secrecy have a right to access information
concerning their origins? At first glance, it seems legally
difficult to recognize such a right retroactively because of the
effect it would have on those who either donated or used
donated gametes under the current regime where anonymity is
the default.96 Nevertheless, more thought should be given to
consider the information needs of both donors and recipients. . . .
(Guideline 9.2).
Furthermore, as:
ART involves complex decision making . . . participants may find it
an emotional and stressful experience,
that is why:
[c]linics must provide readily accessible services from accredited
counsellors to support participants in making decisions about their
treatment, before, during and after the procedures. . . . (Guideline
9.3).
Section 18.1 of the The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic.) will only
allow donor gamets to be used if, before the procedure takes place:
...
(c) the woman and her husband, the donor and the spouse of the
donor (if any) have received counselling as to its use from a
counsellor approved under Part 8 to give counselling about the use of
sperm, ovocytes or embryos from named donors.
Counseling is also required by the UK Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990 (UK) 1990, c 37, for the woman (and, if she is
being treated together with a partner, for him or her as well) who is
using donated gametes or embryos (section 13-6); and to offspring
seeking information about their donors (section 31-3) or the specific
person whom she or he proposes to marry (section 31-6). It is also
required for the providers of gametes or embryos (schedule 3, section
3-1 of the UK Act, as well as by section 46 of the Human Assisted
Reproduction Act 2004.)
96

In the adoption setting, see Cheskes c Procureur général de
l’Ontario, 2007 CanLII 38387 (ON SC).
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the creation of a voluntary registration system 97 for those who
were conceived prior to the establishment of the registry. This
is also the case with respect to ensuring that medical
information would be continually updated.
The fundamental right to identity has not yet been
effectively recognized. Bearing in mind the international trend
to recognize such a right, it is now time to revisit the question
and insist upon explicit recognition of this very fundamental
right from the children’s rights perspective.98
CONCLUSION
The international CRC recognizes a right to identity. One
important aspect of this right is the right to know one’s origins.
In recent years, the number of nations that have banned the
anonymous character of gamete donations has increased,
including nations that once strongly supported such a position.
This shift in national legislative policy worldwide has aided the
growing recognition of the right to know one’s origins in
international law and gives a wider effect to this fundamental
right.
To date, the rights and interests of adult parties to ART
(prospective parents and gamete donors) have been favoured.
This privileging of adult interests has been justified by
arguments of confidentiality and privacy and buttressed by the
established regime surrounding ART in Canada. However,
97

Human Assisted Reproduction Act 2004 (NZ), 2004/92, s 63 and
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK), 2008, c. 22, s
24 are good examples. See also Blyth & Frith, supra note 5 at 10-11.

98

On the necessity on moving towards effective recognition of the
rights of the child, see Trahan, supra note 40 at 151. See also Howe,
supra note 40 at 361-382; Allison Harvison Young, “Reconceiving
the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family”
(1998) 6 Journal of Gender & the Law 505 at 551; and Wallbank,
supra note 22 at 262.
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given the rise in the right to know one’s origins in the
international sphere, provincial and territorial law reforms are
required to explicitly recognize the right of the child to know
his or her biological origins. The current legal system grants
donors and parents a choice, while children have none. While
donors can take measures to protect their own best interests,
children cannot.99 This is why it is time to put the child first!

99

George J Annas, “Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of
the Sperm Donor” (1980) 14 Fam LQ 1 at 11.

